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Manipulating the reported age in earliest memories
Ineke Wessel, Theresa Schweig and Rafaële J. C. Huntjens
Clinical Psychology and Experimental Psychopathology, University of Groningen, Groningen, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
Previous work suggests that the estimated age in adults’ earliest autobiographical memories
depends on age information implied by the experimental context [e.g., Kingo, O. S., Bohn, A.,
& Krøjgaard, P. (2013). Warm-up questions on early childhood memories affect the reported
age of earliest memories in late adolescence. Memory, 21(2), 280–284. doi:10.1080/
09658211.2012.729598] and that the age in decontextualised snippets of memory is younger
than in more complete accounts (i.e., event memories [Bruce, D., Wilcox-O’Hearn, L. A.,
Robinson, J. A., Phillips-Grant, K., Francis, L., & Smith, M. C. (2005). Fragment memories mark
the end of childhood amnesia. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 567–576. doi:10.3758/
BF03195324]). We examined the malleability of the estimated age in undergraduates’ earliest
memories and its relation with memory quality. In Study 1 (n = 141), vignettes referring to
events happening at age 2 rendered earlier reported ages than examples referring to age 6.
Exploratory analyses suggested that event memories were more sensitive to the age
manipulation than memories representing a single, isolated scene (i.e., snapshots). In Study 2
(n = 162), asking self-relevant and public-event knowledge questions about participants’
preschool years prior to retrieval yielded comparable average estimated ages. Both types of
semantic knowledge questions rendered earlier memories than a no-age control task. Overall,
the reported age in snapshots was younger than in event memories. However, age-
differences between memory types across conditions were not statistically significant.
Together, the results add to the growing literature indicating that the average age in earliest
memories is not as fixed as previously thought.
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Infantile or childhood amnesia is the phenomenon that
adults have very few to no memories from their first
years of life (see for overviews, Bauer, 2014; Pillemer,
1998; Rubin, 2000). Overall, a large body of research
suggests that the grand average of the age reported in
first memories is 3.5 years across multiple studies (Tustin
& Hayne, 2010).
There is some evidence, however, that the age in ear-
liest memories is not carved in stone. To begin with,
Wang and Peterson (2014) interviewed children in
various age groups (ranging from 4 to 13 years old)
about their earliest memory twice, with a delay of 1–2
years between interviews. On the second interview, the
same event was, on average, dated 5–7 months later. The
results of a subsequent study (Wang & Peterson, 2016)
assessing a subgroup of the children 8 years after the
initial interview, suggested that the younger children (4–
5 years old at baseline) continued to postdate the same
memories. The memories were dated as having occurred
more than a year later than at initial recall. Thus, dating ear-
liest memories may fall prey to a spontaneous postdating
bias (i.e., forward telescoping, Janssen, Chessa, & Murre,
2006). Furthermore, the age in earliest memories may be
affected by experimental manipulations. Kingo, Bohn,
and Krøjgaard (2013) examined the effects of “warm-up”
retrieval. That is, prior to retrieving their very first
memory, participants were instructed to recall events
from when they were either 3 or 6 years old. This procedure
rendered earlier first memories in the age 3 group than in
the age 6 group. Likewise, Peterson, Kaasa, and Loftus
(2009) found that participants who had overheard confed-
erates talking about very early experiences reported ear-
liest memories in which they were younger than
participants who had not been exposed to social influence.
In addition, Malinoski and Lynn (1999) reported that at the
start of their study, 11% of their participants reported ear-
liest memories from before the age of 2. Yet, at some time
during an extensive probing procedure, 78% of the partici-
pants reported memories of such a young age.
Together, these results indicate that the age in earliest
memories is malleable. This fits with the general notion
that dating memories is a reconstructive activity (Friedman,
1993; Janssen et al., 2006). Unlike digital photos, memories
do not contain a time-stamp (Arbuthnott & Brown, 2009).
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Sometimes a specific date is part of the factual knowledge
(i.e., semantic memory) that is activated together with the
recollective re-experiencing (i.e., episodic memory) of a
particular event, such as one’s wedding day. More often,
however, the “when” of a recalled event is inferred from
characteristics of the memory representation (e.g., clarity,
familiarity, ease of accessibility) or from context infor-
mation (e.g., the distance of the retrieved event relative
to a landmark event; Arbuthnott & Brown, 2009; Janssen
et al., 2006). This may of course, easily result in errors
(Peterson et al., 2009). Yet, the studies on dating malleabil-
ity raise the intriguing possibility that earliest memories
could be of an earlier age than is generally assumed in
the literature on infantile amnesia (Wang & Peterson,
2014, 2016). For example, compared to the grand
average of 3.5 years (Tustin & Hayne, 2010), younger
average ages were obtained in the experiments reported
by Kingo et al. (2013; M = 2.7 years in the complete age 3
group) and Peterson et al. (2009; M = 2.99 years in the con-
federate group). Perhaps the age information provided by
the study context (e.g., 3 vs. 6 years old) primes participants
to search for a memory within a particular life-time period
(e.g., “when I was in Kindergarten” vs. “when I was in
primary school”). This fits with evidence suggesting that
using cues is important for obtaining relatively early mem-
ories. Tustin and Hayne (2010) used idiosyncratic timelines
displaying photos of the participants at various ages
ranging from new-born to current age in an ascending
order. Roughly 40% of participating children (up to 12–13
years old) recalled events from before age 2, compared
to 4% of adults. Jack and Hayne (2010) found that even
adults can come up with memories from under age 2
when a timeline is combined with exhaustive interviewing.
Why would extensive cueing bring about earlier mem-
ories than merely asking participants for their earliest
memory? The instruction to retrieve an earliest memory
likely invites a strategic search in memory (i.e., generative
retrieval, Conway, 2005). However, in itself such a general
instruction contains few cues, and it is up to the remem-
berer to generate them. In general, retrieval success
depends on the extent to which retrieval cues match
some aspect of the memory representation (Tulving &
Thomson, 1973). A detailed episodic representation will
have a higher probability of being recalled, especially
when it is connected to various bits of factual knowledge
(i.e., semantic memory), simply because multiple types of
cues will match. However, compared to later memories,
early memories are impoverished in that they contain
fewer narrative categories (e.g., who, where; Bauer &
Larkina, 2014; West & Bauer, 1999) and that they have
fewer connections with factual knowledge (Howe, 2013;
Pillemer, 1998). In addition, factual knowledge may be
absent or organised differently in children than adults
(Conway, 2005; Howe, 2013), resulting in reduced ways of
accessing early representations with further development.
Thus, for older children and adults, general “describe-your-
earliest-memory” instructions would elicit too few cues
that overlap with too few elements in early representations
for retrieval to be successful. Extensive cueing would
provide more specific cues matching these sketchy mem-
ories (Pillemer, 1998). That does not mean that all early
experiences could be accessed if only the right trigger
were available. Early, sketchy memories are thought to
have a high probability of getting lost because retrieval
opportunities are limited due to a lack of narrative organ-
isation (e.g., Bauer, 2014; Bauer & Larkina, 2014).
Nevertheless, some sketchy early memories may survive
and turn up in a memory search in adulthood. Mullen
(1994) observed that 12–15% of adults’ earliest memories
retrieved under general instructions were images rather
than events. Interestingly, the age in these image mem-
ories was younger than in the event memories. Bruce
et al. (2005, experiment 2) took this a step further and
instructed their participants to report their earliest frag-
ment memories as well as their earliest event memories.
Fragment memories were defined as “noncontextualized,
stand-alone snippets of the past that are recollections of
sensory experiences (images of a visual, auditory, olfactory,
or other sensory nature), behaviors or actions, or feelings or
emotions” (Bruce et al., 2005, p. 568). An event memory
was defined as a story with a beginning and end. The
results suggested that earliest fragment memories were
of a younger age than earliest event memories. In addition,
the memory types differed on a number of dimensions. For
example, compared to event memories, fragments were
rated as less vivid, less often rehearsed, evoking less
intense feelings at the time and rendering less confidence
about age estimates (Bruce et al., 2005, experiment 2;
Bruce, Phillips-Grant, Wilcox-O’Hearn, Robinson, & Francis,
2007).
The findings regarding memory fragments may have
methodological implications for studies on earliest mem-
ories. Next to having a lower chance of retrieval due to rela-
tively few appropriate cues, sketchy early memories may
not be recognised as memories. That is, characteristics
such as vagueness may cause rejection of a fragment as
a suitable memory candidate. If so, the fragment will not
be reported. Tustin and Hayne (2010) suggested that this
may explain their finding that children reported younger
earliest memories than adults. Perhaps adults set a
higher bar and only report detailed memories, whereas
children may accept more sketchy fragments as memories.
In line with this, a study instructing adult participants to
only report memories that they were certain to remember
yielded relatively late memories (i.e., older than age 6 on
average; Wells, Morrison, & Conway, 2014).
We present two studies that further examined the mal-
leability of age in earliest memories, taking the possibility
that memory fragments are underreported into account.
Specifically, prior to instructing participants to retrieve
their earliest memory, we explicitly informed them that
early memories may be sketchy, and presented them
with examples of both fragment and event memories. In
this way, we aimed at lowering the bar for reporting
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sketchy memories. Study 1 addressed the possibility that
including information about age in experimental instruc-
tions would affect the average age reported for earliest
memories (cf. Kingo et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2009).
The instructions contained vignettes referring to either
an early or a late age (around 2 years vs. 6 years). We
expected younger average ages in the early than the late
condition. In addition, if fragment memories are from an
earlier age, we expected to find more fragment memories
in the early condition than in the late condition. To briefly
preview the results, we found no fragment memories in a
strict sense (i.e., disconnected pieces of memory). We had
adapted Bruce et al.’s (2005) coding scheme to include
snapshot memories, i.e., mental pictures without a tem-
poral sequence. We therefore explored whether the early
condition would report more snapshot memories than
the late condition. Alternatively, the late age group was
expected to report more event memories containing an
elaborate, narrative structure. Furthermore, we explored
the strategies that people used to date their memory and
whether the different instructions would affect age esti-




N = 141 undergraduate students (34%male) participated in
exchange for course credit. Their mean age was 20.4 years
(SD = 1.62, range 17–28). They were enrolled in an inter-
national (English-language) bachelor programme of psy-
chology of a Dutch university. The majority was West-
European, i.e., German (75.9%), Dutch (6.4%) or British
(2.1%). The remaining 15.6% of the sample had various
other backgrounds. The participants were assigned to
either an early (n = 74) or a late (n = 67) condition. Partici-
pants in these conditions did not differ with respect to
current age, gender and West-European nationality (see
Table 1). The study was approved by the departmental
ethics committee.
Material
The questionnaire was constructed in English, using Qual-
trics software (Version October, 2014) and consisted of the
following sections.
Earliest memory and age manipulation. Participants
reported their earliest memory after reading three
examples of earliest memories (inspired by Peterson
et al., 2009) that contained age information. Critically, the
early condition read vignettes from around age 2, and
the late condition from around age 6. In addition,
because in general participants may be unsure whether
decontextualised fragments would count as “memories”,
we attempted to facilitate the reporting of fragment mem-
ories in two ways. First, the examples contained an event
memory (i.e., a second vs. a sixth birthday party), a
fragment memory (i.e., taking first steps vs. learning to
ride a bicycle) and a description containing characteristics
of both memory types (i.e., a fight with a sibling). Second,
the actual instructions specifically mentioned the possi-
bility of fragment memories (i.e., lacking continuity, back-
ground information and details). Participants were also
instructed to report an experience that they could actually
remember and not one that they merely knew that had
happened to them.
Age estimation, confidence and strategies. After describ-
ing their memory, participants estimated their age in the
memory by using separate drop-down menus for the
year and the month (e.g., 4 years; 6 months). In addition,
they indicated how confident they were in both estimates
using slider scales ranging from 0 (= not at all sure) to 100
(= 100% sure). Participants indicated how they came up
with their age estimates by choosing one of three
options (i.e., “I just knew”; “I used a strategy” and “It was
a wild guess”). If participants indicated that they just
knew or that they used a strategy, they were asked to
describe how they arrived at their estimate as detailed as
possible.
Memory characteristics. Memory characteristics (adapted
from the AMCQ, Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2015; and Bruce
et al., 2005) were assessed with 66 items using 7-point
Likert scales (1 = Totally disagree–7 = Totally agree). Orig-
inally, the AMCQ has 63 items distributed over 14 subscales
(ranging from 3 to 5 items per subscale). We omitted one
item (I can remember the district in which the event took
place) because it does not apply to the Netherlands. The
AMCQ dimensions capture the characteristics probed by
Bruce et al. (2005), except for continuity and uniqueness.
Therefore, we added two items about the extent to
which participants recalled things that took place immedi-
ately before and after the reported event (Continuity, Cron-
bach’s α = .69) and two items about whether the memory
reflected a one-time experience (Cronbach’s α = .81).
Reliability analyses of the AMCQ showed poor alphas for
two subscales (Time and Place details, Cronbach’s α = .32;
Emotional Distancing, Cronbach’s α = .17), so these sub-
scales were not used in the analyses. For the other sub-
scales, alpha’s were fair to excellent (Vividness,
Cronbach’s α = .84; Belief in Accuracy, Cronbach’s α = .77;
Sensory Details, Cronbach’s α = .71; Sharing, Cronbach’s α
= .88; Observer Perspective, Cronbach’s α = .81; Field Per-
spective, Cronbach’s α = .84; Narrative Coherence, Cron-
bach’s α = .63; Valence, Cronbach’s α = .96; Emotional
Intensity, Cronbach’s α = .87; Preoccupation with Emotion,
Cronbach’s α = .87). For two subscales, poor Cronbach’s
alphas improved after removing one item with low item-
total correlations (Accessibility Cronbach’s α = .86; Recollec-
tion Cronbach’s α = .76).1 We used these adjusted
subscales.
Fragmentation. We constructed two items to measure
subjective sense of memory fragmentation. First, we pro-
vided descriptions of fragment and event memories. Two
slider scales (range 0 = “strongly disagree”–100 = “strongly
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agree”) were used to indicate to which degree a memory
was like a fragment and like an event memory with a nar-
rative structure. The event memory rating was coded rever-
sely and the average of both scales was used as an index of
fragmentation. The reliability of this measure was good,
Cronbach’s α = .82.
Control questions. Three final questions asked the par-
ticipants to indicate (1) what they thought the purpose
of the study was (open question); (2) whether they filled
in the questionnaire truthfully (yes/no) and (3) whether
they believed that it is possible that people report mem-
ories from age 2 and below (yes/no).
Procedure
The participants were recruited for a study on first mem-
ories through an online research participant management
system, which directed participants to the online Qualtrics
questionnaire after signing up. Participants provided
informed consent, as well as their gender, age, language
and their month of birth. Because at the time we were
unaware of the possibility of random assignment in Qual-
trics, birth month was used for allocating participants to
either the early or late condition (odd birth months –
early condition; even birth months – late condition). This
strategy rendered more participants in the early condition,
and the final n = 12 were allocated to the late condition
irrespective of birth month.
Coding
The memories were experimenter-coded based on the par-
ticipants’ verbal descriptions. We adapted Bruce et al.’s
(2005) coding scheme, using four categories. A fragment
referred to a disconnected piece of memory, lacking all
background information (e.g., a sensory impression). A
snapshot was defined as a mental picture without a tem-
poral sequence, but possibly containing some context
information (e.g., “My first memory goes back to when I
was in my old parent’s house, I remember myself in my
room, looking at the shelf with my comics on it.”). An
event memory referred to a description containing a
clear temporal sequence (“I am running down the
hallway crying, I am sitting down to watch a movie. It is a
movie about dinosaurs. My mom comes in the room and
asks me why I’m crying. I point at the TV while crying”). A
repetitive memory referred to multiple similar events
(e.g., “I remember my great granddad buying me cola at
the bar in his retirement home every time I went there”).
One of the authors (TS) coded all memories. Two raters
(TS and IW) coded 57 memories (38%) independently.
Inter-rater reliability was good (κ = .87).
Analyses
Initially, 159 participants2 initiated the online question-
naire. The data from 18 participants were discarded: n = 6
were non-completers; n = 4 indicated that they had not
completed the questionnaire truthfully and inspection of
the strategy questions revealed that n = 8 had asked their
parents’ help for dating their memory. Thus, the final
sample consisted of 141 participants. Inspection of the
control questions revealed that no-one guessed the
purpose of the study (i.e., manipulating age through
instructions).
For the analyses, a single age estimate in months was
calculated by multiplying the number of years by 12 and
adding the month estimate. Two extreme outliers were
assigned a value of 1 unit above the second highest
Table 1. Demographic variables, belief in memory from age 2 and under, age in earliest memory, memory type and strategies in the early and late conditions
in Study 1.
Condition





Current age, years (M, SD) 20.2 (1.34) 20.5 (1.87) t(118.6)a =−1.26 d = 0.22
Female gender (%) 67.6 64.2 Χ2(1) = 0.18 d = 0.07
West-European (%)b 83.8 85.1 Χ2(1) = 0.04 d = 0.04
Age in Memory, months (M, SD) 38.6 (12.7) 47.9 (17.6) t(119)a =−3.55** d = 0.61
Snapshots (%) 48.6 41.8 Χ2(1) = 0.67 d = 0.14
Fragmentation (M, SD) 55.4 (28.2) 52.3 (31.9) t(139) = 0.60 d = 0.10
Way of estimating years (%)c Χ2(2) = 9.54** V = .26
Used a strategy 54.1 62.7 Χ2(1) = 1.08 d = 0.18
Just knew 13.5 25.4 Χ2(1) = 3.19 d = 0.30
Wild guess 32.4 11.9 Χ2(1) = 8.42** d = 0.50
Way of estimating months (%)c Χ2(2) = 0.30 V = .046
Used a strategy 21.6 19.4
Just knew 6.8 9.0
Wild guess 71.6 71.6
Confidence
Years (Median, Inter-quartile range) 64 (55) 74 (43) U = 2105 d = 0.26
Months (Median, Inter-quartile range) 11.5 (37) 20 (53) U = 2304 d = 0.12
Belief in memory≤ age 2 (%) 36.5 35.8 Χ2(1) = 0.01 d = 0.01
aAdjusted df.
bPercentage of participants with either a Dutch, German or English nationality.
cOnly if the overall test was significant, follow-up comparisons are reported.
**p < .01.
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value (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). The same procedure was
followed for outliers in the memory characteristic variables
(sharing 1 outlier; preoccupation with emotion 1 outlier;
continuity 2 outliers). Group differences were examined
using analyses of variance (ANOVAs), t-tests and, if assump-
tions were not met, nonparametric Mann–Whitney U tests.
We used a sequential Bonferroni–Holm procedure in the
exploratory ANOVAs to control for family-wise error rates
(Cramer et al., 2016).
Results and discussion
Age in the early and late conditions
As can be seen in Table 1, the early condition reported a
lower average age in their in earliest memories than the
late condition A t-test showed that this difference was stat-
istically significant.
Exploratory analyses
Memory type in the early and late conditions. Regarding
memory type, it was unexpected that none of the mem-
ories received a fragment coding. In total, 45.4% of the
memories were coded as snapshots and three memories
were coded as repetitive memories. We incorporated the
repetitive memories in the event memory category. A Χ2
test revealed that the percentages of experimenter-
coded snapshots did not differ significantly between the
conditions. Likewise, the conditions did not differ signifi-
cantly with respect to self-reported fragmentation. Thus,
the evidence for the predictions that the early condition
would report more sketchy memories than the late con-
dition was inconclusive at both the objective (exper-
imenter-coded) and subjective (self-report) level.
Strategies and belief in very early memories. We first
explored the participants’ strategies for arriving at their
estimate of the number of years in the age in their earliest
memory. An overall Χ2 test showed a statistically significant
difference in strategy use between the early and late con-
ditions. As can be seen in Table 1, more participants in the
early condition said that they had guessed the number of
years. Using a strategy or just knowing the number of years
did not statistically differ between the groups. The majority
of participants (71.6%) guessed the number of months. The
conditions did not differ statistically.
As for confidence in estimates of the number of years
and the number of months, nonparametric Mann–
Whitney U tests showed no statistically significant differ-
ences between the early and late conditions.
Next, we explored the possibility that the reported ages
were biased by the age information in the vignettes. That
is, the participants may have inadvertently reported an
age similar to the age in the instructions just because
they read it prior to the estimation process and used it as
input without actually probing their memory for infor-
mation about their age. Indeed, Greenberg, Bishara, and
Mugayar-Baldocchi (2017) found that asking whether
someone’s earliest memory was from before or after a
certain age (e.g., 1 or 6 years) influenced reported ages
dependent on the age provided in that question.
Because such anchoring effects would especially play a
role in judgements under uncertainty, we speculated that
the effect of the instruction may be particularly pro-
nounced in the participants who said to have guessed
their age. In contrast, participants who relied on autobio-
graphical knowledge (e.g., landmark events) in their age
estimation might be less susceptible to context effects.
In order to explore this possibility, we concentrated on
the strategies for arriving at the number of years in partici-
pants’ age estimates. Inspection of these strategies
suggested that the “I just knew” and “I used a strategy”
options did not seem to yield descriptions of qualitatively
different strategies. Therefore, we collapsed them into a
category expressing the use of autobiographical knowl-
edge for all participants (AK-users, n = 108), except for
one participant in the late condition. He had chosen the
“just knew” option, but answered that he did not know
how he knew. This participant and the guessers were
coded as non-AK-users (n = 33).
Next, we contrasted the age estimates of AK-users and
non-AK-users. Testing this difference across the early and
late conditions was complicated by the presence of only
relatively few (n = 9) non-AK-users in the late condition.
As widely varying cell sizes would render a 2 (condition:
early vs. late) × 2 (strategy: using vs. not using autobiogra-
phical knowledge) ANOVA suboptimal, we limited the
comparison of AK-users with non-AK-users to the early con-
dition. In addition, we reasoned that scepticism about the
possibility of very early memories (i.e., from age 2 or under)
might interfere with a context-induced report bias. The
percentages of participants saying that they believed it is
possible that people have memories of age 2 and under
(see Table 1) did not differ statistically between the early
and late conditions, p = .935. However, a t-test revealed
that overall, believers reported significantly younger ages
(M = 38.41, SD = 16.80) than non-believers (M = 45.63, SD
= 14.77), t(139) = 2.65, p = .009, d = 0.45. We therefore con-
trolled for believing in memories from age 2 and under in a
subsequent ANOVA comparing AK-users (n = 50) and non-
AK-users (n = 24) users in the early condition.
The ANOVA showed that the non-AK-users (M = 42.4
months, SD = 12.7) reported to be significantly older in
their memory than the AK-users (M = 36.0 months, SD =
12.5), F(1, 71) = 4.37, p = .04, h2p = .058. The means
adjusted for belief in memories of age 2 and under in the
late condition were 50.8 months (SD = 17.2) for the non-
AK-users (n = 9) and 45.8 months (SD = 17.7) for the AK-
users (n = 58). Thus, the participants who estimated their
age based on autobiographical knowledge reported
earlier memories than the participants who guessed. This
runs counter to the idea that the age information in the
vignettes simply biased the reporting of age estimates: in
that case we would have expected to see the age effects
especially in guessers. Instead, we speculate that the age
information in the vignettes primed participants to start
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their memory search in a particular life-time period. Of
course, the results should be replicated in future studies.
An alternative explanation is that the number of data-
dependent decisions in our exploratory analyses resulted
in inflated type I error, and thus reflects a spurious
finding (see Gelman & Loken, 2014).
Age in snapshots and event memories across conditions.
We also explored whether the age information affected
the age in experimenter-coded snapshots and event mem-
ories differentially. Again, we controlled for belief in mem-
ories from age 2 or under in a 2 (Condition) × 2 (Memory
Type) ANOVA. The main effect for condition, F(1, 136) =
11.35, p = .001, h2p = .077, was statistically significant
(adjusted α = .0167). This main effect is conceptually
similar to the t-test reported earlier, but in this particular
ANOVA it shows that age estimates in the early condition
were significantly younger than in the late condition even
when believing in the possibility of very early memories
was controlled for. In addition, a significant (adjusted
α = .025) main effect for memory type, F(1, 136) = 11.63,
p = .001, h2p = .079, indicated that age in snapshot
memories (m = 37.6, SD = 14.6) was younger than in event
memories (m = 45.8, SD = 14.5). The condition by memory
type interaction effect was statistically significant (adjusted
α = .05), F(1, 136) = 5.50, p = .02, h2p = .039. To follow up on
this interaction, we ran an ANOVA controlling for belief in
memories age 2 and under with the condition by memory
type interaction represented by four different levels (i.e.,
Early Snapshots; Late Snapshots; Early Event memories
and Late Event memories). Post hoc Tukey tests suggested
that especially eventmemories in the late condition differed
from their counterparts in the early condition, mean differ-
ence =−13.82, SE = 3.23, p < .001, and from snapshot mem-
ories in both the late (mean difference =−13.85, SE = 3.51,
p = .001) and early (mean difference =−16.33, SE = 3.28,
p < .001) conditions. All other comparisons did not reveal
significant differences, all p’s > .872. Together, the finding
that snapshots are from a younger age than event mem-
ories extendBruce et al.’s (2005) findings on fragmentmem-
ories. Moreover, the snapshot memories seemed relatively
insensitive to the age manipulation.
Characteristics of snapshot and event memories. We also
explored whether the phenomenological differences
between fragment and event memories (Bruce et al.,
2005) would extend to snapshot memories. Table 2 pre-
sents the characteristics for snapshots and event memories
separately. It should be noted that the three repetitive
memories were excluded from the analyses. Compared to
earlier findings that fragments and event memories dif-
fered on many dimensions (Bruce et al., 2005), there
were only a few statistically significant differences
between the present memory types. Snapshot memories
were rated as less often shared and more fragmented
than event memories. The latter indicates that the exper-
imenter-coded snapshot – event memory distinction
matched the participants’ subjective experience.
Study 2
The results of Study 1 suggest that using a particular age in
instructions for retrieving a first autobiographical memory
may influence the subsequent estimate of the age in that
memory. Study 2 further built upon the idea that the age
information in the vignettes functions as a starting point
for a deliberate search through an autobiographical knowl-
edge base.
According to the self-memory systemmodel of autobio-
graphical memory (e.g., Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000), autobiographical knowledge is hierarchically
organised with layers running from general to specific
information. An important organising principle for the
more abstract layers is that of thematic life-time periods
(e.g., “when I was in elementary school”). People may use
a life-time period as a first entry for self-generating cues
in an iterative search for a specific memory (cf. Conway,
2005). Age information referring to different life-time
periods (e.g., “preschool” vs. “elementary school”) may
thus render different starting points. This first cue may be
elaborated on by activating bits of self-knowledge from
that particular life-time period (“Where did we live?”).
In Study 2 we specifically examined whether activating
self-related semantic knowledge from an early life-time
period (i.e., the preschool years) affects the estimated
age in earliest memories. There were three conditions. In
the self-relevant knowledge condition participants
answered questions about personal facts from their pre-
school period (e.g., the brand of the family car). To
examine whether thinking back on a particular age-
period is sufficient for affecting age estimates, a public-
event knowledge condition asked about news events
that occurred during the participants’ preschool years
(e.g., the fall of the Berlin wall). In the third condition, we
Table 2. Mean ratings of age in and characteristics of snapshots and event









Vividness 3.81 (1.24) 4.05 (1.18) −1.18 0.20
Belief in accuracy 4.26 (0.96) 4.60 (1.11) −1.89 0.33
Accessibility 3.98 (1.74) 4.23 (1.73) −0.83 0.14
Recollection 3.48 (1.16) 3.48 (1.27) 0.04 0
Sensory detail 3.59 (1.15) 3.55 (1.25) 0.19 −0.03
Sharing 3.01 (1.31) 3.73 (1.47) −3.05a 0.52
Narrative coherence 4.15 (1.06) 4.51 (1.01) −2.03 0.35
Observer perspective 4.03 (1.51) 3.73 (1.48) 1.18 −0.20
Field perspective 4.12 (1.54) 4.60 (1.47) −1.85 0.32
Valence 5.37 (1.61) 4.79 (1.77) 1.99 −0.34
Emotional intensity 3.41 (1.06) 3.50 (1.31) −0.46 0.08
Preoccupation with
emotion
2.17 (0.95) 2.28 (1.10) −0.65 0.11
Unique event 4.81 (1.74) 5.53 (1.75) −2.45 0.41
Continuity 2.03 (1.08) 2.35 (1.25) −1.61 0.27
Fragmentation 65.8 (27.6) 43.04 (28.3) 4.78b −0.81
Note: Standard deviations are within parentheses.
ap = .003, adjusted α = .0036.
bp < .001, adjusted α = .0033.
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just asked for participants’ very first memory without age
information. Study 1 lacked such a control and thus it is
unknown whether the age-differences were due to the
early instructions facilitating lower age estimates, or to
the late instructions increasing them.
There were a number of additional methodological
improvements compared to Study 1. To begin with, to
prevent participants from using external information (e.g.,
asking parents) to generate age estimates, they were
tested in the laboratory rather than online. In addition, not
a single memory in Study 1 was coded as a fragment
memory. Perhaps the instructions aiming at lowering the cri-
terion for what counts as amemory had been too implicit. In
Study 2 we explicitly defined fragment and event memories
and clarified how they differed. Finally, we used a briefer
measure of autobiographical memory characteristics in
Study 2 (i.e., MCQ; Schaefer & Philippot, 2005) because anec-
dotal reports suggested that participants in Study 1 found
the AMCQ (Boyacioglu & Akfirat, 2015) long and tedious.
In sum, Study 2 sought to replicate and extend the find-
ings of Study 1 that the age in earliest memories is malle-
able. If the activation of self-relevant knowledge plays a
critical role, we expected to find younger ages in earliest
memories in the self-relevant knowledge condition than
in the public-event knowledge and no-age conditions.
Alternatively, if just thinking about a particular life-time
period is sufficient for generating earlier memories, then
the age estimates in the self-relevant and public-knowl-
edge conditions should be younger than in the no-age
controls. Additionally, we aimed at replicating the finding
that especially snapshot (and fragment) memories are rela-
tively insensitive to an age manipulation.
Method
Participants
Participants were 162 students (25.3% male) with a mean
age of 21.65 years (range 18–25 years). The majority of
the participants had a West-European nationality and
were either German (42%), Dutch (27.2%) or British
(1.9%). Twenty-nine per cent had various other cultural
backgrounds. Participants were randomly assigned to a
self-related knowledge (n = 53), a public-event knowledge
(n = 55) or a control condition (n = 54). Participants in
these conditions did not differ with respect to current
age, gender and West-European nationality (see Table 3).
The participants were reimbursed with either course
credit (n = 4) or 5 Euros (n = 158). The study was approved
by the departmental ethics committee.
Material and procedure
Participants were recruited through advertisements on a
local Facebook group for paid research participants (n =
115) and the departmental online research participant
management system (n = 47). For practical reasons
related to the construction of the public-event questions,
we only included participants between the ages of 18
and 25. Groups with a maximum of three participants
were tested in the laboratory. Each participant was ran-
domly allocated to one of three conditions. After signing
informed consent, participants completed their digital
questionnaires individually at separate desktop computers.
The questionnaire was constructed in Qualtrics (Version
April, 2015). Following demographic information, it
included the following sections.
Knowledge and age manipulation. There were 24 yes/no
questions. The nature of these questions depended on con-
dition. In two conditions the questions concerned knowl-
edge related to the participants’ first three years of life.
Participants were informed that ages 0–3 would be referred
to as their pre-kindergarten (or preschool for Dutch partici-
pants) years. In the Self-related knowledge (SRK) condition,
the questions asked for facts from participants’ lives
during that time (e.g., whether they knew the brand of the
family car; whether there was a pet in their household). In
the Public-event knowledge (PEK) condition, the questions
asked whether particular public events had occurred
during the participants’ first three years of life (e.g., the fall
of the Berlin wall; the introduction of the Euro as European
currency). To avoid response tendencies, 50% of the ques-
tions were tailored to the years matching each participant’s
preschool age (yielding a potential “yes” response), whereas
50% of questions referred to the three years before the par-
ticipant was born (yielding a potential “no”). Thus, for a par-
ticipant whowas 18 years old at the time of the study (2015)
half of the questions were about events that had happened
in 1997–1999, whereas the other half reflected events from
the years 1994–1996. In the Control condition, participants
solved 24 arithmetical problems (e.g., “Is (3 × 2) + 1 = 6?”)
taken from the Operation Span task (Conway et al., 2005).
Participants indicated whether the suggested outcome
was correct (Yes/No). Half of the solutions provided were
correct, the other half was incorrect.
The remainder of the questionnaire was the same in all
three conditions.
Earliest memory. Participants reported their earliest
memory along the lines of the instructions in Study 1,
but the vignettes in Study 2 contained one situation (the
birthday party) that was described as both an event and
a fragment memory. In addition, the differences between
fragment and event memories were described, explicitly
referring to the vignettes. Furthermore, participants were
instructed to report an “experience that you can actually
remember and not one that you merely know from narra-
tions, photographs or videos for instance”.
Age estimation, confidence and strategies. The questions
about age estimates and confidence ratings were identical
to Study 1. The strategy questions now contained two
options (i.e., “It was a wild guess” and “I used a strategy”).
In addition, participants were asked whether there were
videos or photographs of the reported memory. Answers
included one “no” option and three “yes” options (i.e., the
same specific scene; the same event but not the same
scene; the same scene but not the same perspective).
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Autobiographical memory characteristics
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Different from
Study 1, we used Schaefer and Philippot’s (2005) version of
the MCQ. It consists of 20 items asking for characteristics
on different dimensions: (1) “Clarity” (6 items; Cronbach’s
α = .81)3 representing general vividness of the memory
depending on perceptual and sensory information; (2)
“Sensory details” (4 items; Cronbach’s α = .57) reflecting
sound, smell, touch and taste; (3) “Time” (5 items; Cron-
bach’s α = .67) addresses the memories’ time context as
year, season, day and hour; (4) “Spatial context” (3 items;
Cronbach’s α = .67) represents the location and spatial
arrangements of their memory; and (5) “Thoughts and
Feelings” (2 items; Cronbach’s α = .72) the memory for
what they thought and felt at the time. We added 10
items that were used by Bruce et al. (2005, 2007), asking
for the extent to which participants recalled events
before and after the event in their earliest memory (Conti-
nuity, 2 items, see Study 1; Cronbach’s α = .58); valence
(“The overall tone of the memory is negative/positive”,
“My feelings at the time were negative/positive”; Cron-
bach’s α = .95); emotional intensity (1 item); vantage per-
spective (1 item); talking about the event (sharing, 1
item); thinking about it (rehearsal, 1 item); whether the
setting was familiar (1 item) and whether the event
seemed long (duration, 1 item). Each of the 30 items was
rated using a 100-point slider scale.
Centrality. The short version of the Centrality of Event
Scale (CES; Berntsen & Rubin, 2006) assessed how central
the event in the earliest memory was to a person’s
identity and life story. The CES contains 7 items, rated on
a 5-point Likert scale (1 = totally disagree–5 = totally
agree). The total score ranges between 7 and 35 with higher
scores indicating higher centrality. Internal consistency in
the current sample was good (Cronbach’s α = .88).
Fragmentation.We used the same measure of fragmen-
tation as in Study 1. The internal consistency was excellent
(Cronbach’s α = .93).
Control questions. The same control questions as in
Study 1 were used.4
Coding
The memories were coded following the criteria of Study 1
by two independent raters (TS and a research assistant)
who were blind to condition. Their inter-rater reliability
was high, κ = .85. Differences were resolved by discussion.
Analyses
Initially, 166 participants participated in the study. Inspec-
tion of the strategies revealed that four participants had
learned the age in their memory from a family member
on an earlier occasion. The data from these participants
were discarded, leaving a final sample of n = 162. None
of the participants guessed the purpose of the study (i.e.,
manipulating age estimates) and all said to have
responded truthfully. The data-analytic strategies were
similar to Study 1. The age estimate variable was adjusted
as follows. Three extreme outliers were assigned a value of
1 unit above the second highest value and two outliers
were given a value of 1 unit below the second lowest
value of their condition (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It
should be noted that the latter two adjusted values con-
cerned participants who said that they remembered their
own birth and being 3 months old in their memory.
Other variables that were adjusted for outliers in a similar
way were the CES (three outliers); MCQ clarity (three out-
liers); Valence (four outliers); Event duration (five outliers)
and Fragmentation (two outliers).
Results and discussion
Age and memory type across conditions
As can be seen in Table 3, a one-way ANOVA rendered a
significant difference between the conditions regarding
the age in earliest memories. Post hoc Tukey tests indicated
that compared to the control condition, both the SRK
Table 3. Demographic variables, memory type and control variables in the self-relevant knowledge, public-event knowledge and control conditions in Study 2.
Condition







Current age in years (M, SD) 21.9 (1.80) 21.2 (1.66) 21.9 (1.60) F(2, 159) = 2.57 h2p = .031
Female gender (%) 77.4 74.5 72.2 Χ2(2) = 0.37 V = .048
West-European (%)a 73.6 74.5 64.8 Χ2(2) = 1.51 V = .097
Age in memory, months (M, SD) 38.2 (13.3) 37.2 (10.9) 45.7 (17.5) F(2, 159) = 5.83** h2p = .068
Snapshots (%)b 45.3 47.3 46.3 Χ2(2) = 0.04 d = .016
Fragmentation (M, SD) 60.4 (34.5) 68.1 (29.7) 59.84 (32.6) F(2, 159) = 1.12 h2p = .014
Used AK (%)
Year estimate 77.4 69.1 75.9 Χ2(2) = 1.11 d = .083
Month estimate 28.3 38.2 38.9 Χ2(2) = 1.64 d = .101
Confidence
Years (Median, Inter-quartile range) 71 (41) 70 (45) 75 (30) Χ2(2) = 0.18 h2K−W = .001
Months (Median, Inter-quartile range) 26 (88) 25 (63) 25 (71) Χ2(2) = 0.29 h2K−W = .002
Photos of the event (%) 24.5 27.3 20.4 Χ2(2) = 0.72 V = .067
Belief in memory≤ age 2 (%) 49.1 38.2 44.4 Χ2(2) = 1.31 V = .090
Notes: SRK = self-relevant knowledge; PEK = public-event knowledge and IQR = inter-quartile range.
aPercentage of participants with either a Dutch, German or English nationality.
bIncludes four fragments.
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(mean difference = 7.46, SE = 2.43) and the PEK (mean
difference = 8.52, SE = 2.41) reported significantly younger
ages. The SRK and PEK conditions did not differ signifi-
cantly from each other. Thus, having participants think
about an early life-time period (i.e., their preschool years)
was sufficient to affect the age in their earliest memories.
These results suggest that activating self-relevant knowl-
edge is not crucial to elicit younger ages.
Overall six memories (3.7%) were coded as repetitive
and four memories (2.5%) were fragments. Because of
their low frequency, repetitive memories were incorpor-
ated in the event memory category and fragments were
included in the snapshot memory category. The conditions
did not differ significantly with respect to the number of
experimenter-coded snapshot memories. Likewise, there
were no significant differences with regard to self-reported
fragmentation. Thus, in line with findings in the early con-
dition in Study 1, participants reported younger ages in the
conditions that referred to an early life-time period but the
evidence that their memories were sketchier than those in
controls was inconclusive.
Confidence, pictures, belief in memories from age 2
and under, and strategies
Table 3 also shows that there were no significant differ-
ences between the conditions regarding participants’ con-
fidence in their age estimates. In addition, 24.1% of the
sample said that there were pictures or videos that were
associated with their memories. Because of the relatively
low number of participants that endorsed the various
“yes” items (i.e., 6.8% same specific scene; 9.3% same
event but other scene; 8% same event but other perspec-
tive), these percentages were collapsed into one “yes” cat-
egory. The percentage of endorsers did not differ
significantly between conditions. On average, the age in
earliest memories did not significantly differ between par-
ticipants who had photos or videos corresponding to the
memory (M = 42.0, SD = 15.8) and those who did not
(M = 39.8, SD = 14.2), t(160) =−0.82, p = .412, d = 0.15. Fur-
thermore, the percentage of participants who believed
that it is possible that people have memories of age 2 or
under did not differ significantly across conditions.
However, participants who said that they believed in the
possibility of having memories from age 2 or under esti-
mated their age as significantly younger (M = 33.8, SD =
13.1) in their memories than participants who did not
(M = 45.5, SD = 13.6), t(160) = 5.52, p < .001, d =−0.87.
Similar to Study 1, we explored whether the use of auto-
biographical knowledge rendered different age estimates
across condition. It can be seen in Table 3 that the percen-
tages of AK-users did not differ significantly between con-
ditions. A 2 (AK-use) × 3 (Condition) ANOVA controlling for
belief in early memories showed no significant main effect
of AK-use, F(1, 155) = 0.06, p = .807, h2p , .001. Likewise,
there was no significant AK-use by condition interaction,
F(1, 155) = 0.954, p = .387, h2p = .012. For AK-users, the
ages were M = 37.2, (SD = 2.02); M = 36.8, (SD = 2.13) and
M = 45.7 (SD = 2.02) for the SRK, PEK and Control con-
ditions, respectively. For the non-AK-users, the ages were
M = 41.3, (SD = 3.73) for SRK, M = 33.6 (SD = 3.13) for PRK
and M = 43.0 (SD = 3.60) for controls.
Age in snapshots and event memories across
conditions
Next, we checked whether the finding in Study 1 that the
age in snapshots and event memories differed across con-
ditions would also be evident in Study 2. As belief in mem-
ories from age 2 or under affected age estimates, we
controlled for this variable in a 3 (Condition) × 2 (Memory
Type) ANOVA. The main effect for Condition, F(2, 155) =
7.49, p = .001, h2p = 0.09, was statistically significant
(adjusted α = .0167). Thus, the difference between the con-
ditions remained statistically significant after controlling
for belief in very early memories. The main effect of
memory type, F(1, 155) = 9.17, p = .003, h2p = .056, was
also significant (adjusted α = .025). Overall, participants
reported to be younger in snapshot (M = 36.4, SD = 12.6)
than in event memories (M = 42.5, SD = 12.7). The con-
dition by memory type interaction F(2, 155) = 0.85,
p = .430, h2p = .011, was not statistically significant
(adjusted α = .05). Thus, the finding in Study 1 that
especially event memories were sensitive to the age
manipulation was not replicated.
Characteristics of snapshot and event memories
Table 4 displays the subjective ratings of the phenomeno-
logical characteristics of snapshots and event memories.
Repetitive memories were excluded from the analyses.
Three out of 15 comparisons were significant after sequen-
tial Bonferroni correction. Snapshots were rated as contain-
ing poorer recall of what happened before and after, as
more fragmented and as more positive than event
memories.
General discussion
We report on two studies examining whether age infor-
mation implied by the experimental context influences
the reported age in participant’s earliest memories. In
Study 1 participants were presented with vignettes
describing earliest memories that explicitly mentioned a
specific age that was either early (1–2 years old) or late
(5–6 years old). On average, participants in the early con-
dition reported to be significantly younger in their first
memories than participants in the late condition. Study 2
examined whether activating self-relevant knowledge
from the preschool years is important for decreasing the
age in earliest memories. Thinking about self-relevant
information from this earliest life-time period indeed
resulted in younger average ages than in a no-age
control group. However, thinking about public events
from this life-time period also rendered earlier ages. The
age estimates in the public-event knowledge and self-rel-
evant knowledge conditions did not differ in a statistically
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significant fashion. Thus, it seems that in itself, thinking
about an early life-time period results in reporting earlier
ages and that the type of information that is thought
about is not particularly important.
In both studies the average ages in the conditions refer-
ring to an early life-time period were a little over 3 years
old. At first sight this is younger than the grand average
of 3.5 years in the literature (Tustin & Hayne, 2010). As
Study 1 lacked a control condition that was silent about
age, it is unknown whether the early instructions in Study
1 facilitated lower age estimates, or whether the late
instructions increased them. The difference between the
knowledge conditions and the no-age control condition
in Study 2, however, suggests that the age in earliest mem-
ories can indeed be reliably decreased. This fits with earlier
findings that participants reported earlier ages after manip-
ulations introducing relatively young ages (Kingo et al.,
2013; Peterson et al., 2009). The ages reported in these
earlier studies were even slightly younger (i.e., about 32
months in the early condition in Kingo et al., 2013; 36
months in Peterson et al., 2009) than in our studies (i.e.,
between 37.2 and 38.6 months). This may have to do
with the manner of asking the questions. In the previous
studies participants just wrote down their age, whereas
we asked for separate estimates of the number of years
and months. Perhaps people are less inclined to write
down the number of months spontaneously. Asking for
the number of months on top of the number of years
would then results in slightly older ages.
We also expected that the manipulations bringing
down the age in earliest memories would yield more
sketchy memories, in line with earlier work reporting that
fragments are younger than event memories (Bruce et al.,
2005). Contrary to expectations both studies yielded few
fragment memories. In addition, the percentages of snap-
shot memories (i.e., isolated images) did not differ signifi-
cantly between conditions. Yet, reminiscent of earlier
findings in fragment memories (Bruce et al., 2005), both
studies showed that irrespective of condition, snapshot
memories were of a younger age than event memories.
Moreover, the results of Study 1 suggested that the differ-
ence between the early and late condition was most pro-
minent for the event memories. The age estimates of
snapshots seemed to be less sensitive to the age manipu-
lation. However, this pattern of results was not replicated in
Study 2.
The present studies explored two types of explanations
for observations that the average age in earliest memories
is malleable. In Study 1, the possibility that age estimates
reflect a context-induced report bias was explored. The
idea was that once a childhood memory has been
retrieved, people use the externally provided age infor-
mation as an anchor for estimating their age in that
memory (Greenberg et al., 2017). Usually people use
highly salient experiences with a known age (i.e., landmark
experiences, e.g., one’s first day at school) as a reference
point for estimating their age in autobiographical mem-
ories (Arbuthnott & Brown, 2009). This should inoculate
age estimations against context effects. Thus, if indeed
the age in the instructions were echoed in participants’
age estimates, this should be especially apparent in
people guessing their age. In the absence of autobiogra-
phical knowledge people might (inadvertently) use contex-
tual information in their answers. However, Study 1
showed the opposite pattern: guessers in the early con-
dition were older in their earliest memory than participants
who had used autobiographical knowledge. This renders
an explanation in terms of a context-induced report bias





(n = 81) Test statistic Cohen’s d
Event centrality (M, SD) 12.5 (4.78) 13.2 (5.52) t(154) =−0.90 0.15
MCQ
Clarity (M, SD) 59.1 (18.7) 63.23 (14.9) t(154) =−1.53 0.24
Sensory Detail (Median, Interquartile range) 15 (32) 22.8 (21) U = 2382 0.38
Time (M, SD) 33.7 (20.8) 36.0 (20.1) t(154) =−0.69 0.11
Context (M, SD) 64.4 (22.0) 65.0 (21.8) t(154) =−0.18 0.03
Thoughts & feelings (M, SD) 42.9 (29.3) 51.5 (24.9) t(154) =−1.98 0.32
Field perspective (Median, Interquartile range) 84 (50) 74 (46) U = 2767 0.15
Emotion
Valence (M, SD) 77.4 (23.4) 53.3 (31.0) t(154) = 5.51a −0.87
Intensity (M, SD) 57.9 (25.6) 61.3 (24.6) t(154) =−0.85 0.14
Thought about it (M, SD) 45.8 (24.2) 47.7 (28.0) t(154) =−0.47 0.07
Talked about it (Median, Interquartile range) 19 (42) 20 (42) U = 2984 0.03
Event duration (M, SD) 29.5 (24.6) 34.3 (23.8) t(154) =−1.23 0.20
Setting unfamiliar (Median, Interquartile range) 20 (49) 18 (31) U = 2789 0.14
Continuity (Med, IQR) 1.50 (14.5) 24.5 (38) U = 1703b 0.82
Fragmentation (M, SD) 72.1 (30.1) 55.2 (32.7) t(154) = 3.35c −0.81
Notes: Standard deviations or inter-quartile ranges are within parentheses.
ap < .001, adjusted α = .0033.
bp < .001, adjusted α = .0036.
cp = .001, adjusted α = .0038.
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less likely. Yet, this interpretation is based on exploratory
analyses that should be replicated independently. An
explanation in terms of priming or anchoring cannot be
excluded at this point and future studies may further
shed light on this issue.
The second type of explanation for the malleability of
age in earliest memories is that the search process is influ-
enced by the age information in the experimental context.
That is, participants may use the life-time period referred to
as a starting point for a deliberate memory search. It is
thought that in order to navigate the search, the process
involves iterations of self-generating cues (e.g., Conway,
2005). Starting within a particular life-time period would
increase the probability that these self-generated cues rep-
resent knowledge that is specific to that life-time period.
This, in turn, would increase the probability of retrieving
a memory from that particular life-time period. Study 2
examined whether self-related knowledge questions
about an early life-time period would aid the search
process and result in younger ages. The lack of difference
between the self-related and public-event-related knowl-
edge conditions suggests that focussing on personal
knowledge is not crucial for generating earlier memories
than when no life-time period at all is used. In itself, think-
ing about an early period in life seems to be sufficient to
render memories of younger ages. Perhaps the public-
event questions provided participants with an anchor
point to start their search, after which they turned to self-
generating cues relying on knowledge from that life-time
period to an equal extent as the participants in the self-rel-
evant knowledge condition. It seems that the notion that
age information in the experimental context provides a
starting point for a memory search suffices to explain
age-differences in earliest memories in the present
studies. Future studies may examine this explanation
further. Future work may also compare the impact of
using vignettes (Study 1) and activating life-time period
knowledge (Study 2) directly.
It has been suggested that sketchy memories are indica-
tive of a developmentally earlier stage (Bruce et al., 2005;
Conway, 2005; Pillemer, 1998). However, we did not find
that the early conditions in our studies rendered more frag-
ment memories than late or control conditions. In fact, we
obtained very few fragment memories according to the
rather strict criterion that they should represent decontex-
tualised snippets of previous experience (cf. Bruce et al.,
2005). Instead, we found that just under half of the mem-
ories fitted a category that we termed snapshot memories,
reflecting scenes that did have some context but lacked
temporal order. The percentages of snapshot memories
were fairly consistent across conditions and studies (i.e.,
ranging from 41.8% to 48.6%) and they were consistently
of a younger age than event memories across conditions.
A comparison of phenomenological characteristics
yielded only a few meaningful differences between snap-
shots and events. In both studies snapshots were more
fragmented than events. In Study 1, events were shared
more often and in Study 2 they contained more continuity
and were less positive than snapshots. However, Bruce
et al. (2005) reported that fragments and event memories
differed in many more aspects and this suggests that snap-
shots may qualitatively differ from fragments. It should be
noted that a number of the characteristics (recalling what
happened before and after; fragmentation) are implied
by the definition of snapshots and event memories and
differences would thus reflect our coding scheme.
However, these definitions are silent about emotional
valence. It is interesting that snapshots were rated as
more positive than event memories as the findings regard-
ing emotional valence in the broader literature on child-
hood amnesia have been mixed (West & Bauer, 1999). To
inform theory, future studies may further explore the use-
fulness of a distinction between fragments and snapshots.
In addition, future work may follow up on the finding in
Study 1 that snapshots seemed to be less sensitive to the
age manipulation.
There are some methodological considerations that
deserve attention. For example, it may be that in general,
participants do not consider fragment memories as mem-
ories because of their characteristics such as vagueness
(Tustin & Hayne, 2010). In spite of our attempts to lower
the criterion for accepting mental representations as mem-
ories we obtained only a few fragment memories. It should
be noted that in Bruce et al.’s studies, participants were
explicitly instructed to retrieve fragment memories,
whereas we coded memory type in a post hoc fashion.
Thus, the very low number of fragments obtained in the
present studies may indicate that participants did not
readily retrieve fragments spontaneously. Future studies
may use explicit instructions to retrieve fragments. In
addition, our criteria for coding fragments may have
been more stringent than in Bruce et al.’s (2005, 2007)
studies. More generally, a distinction between categories
of fragment and snapshots may be rather arbitrary.
Future work may rely on scoring on a continuum running
from “fragment” to “event” as this might more closely
reflect the richness of the participants’ memory reports.
Furthermore, we used different measures of autobiogra-
phical memory characteristics in Studies 1 and 2, rendering
the results less comparable. Future studies may optimise
the assessment of characteristics.
A further consideration is that our samples mainly con-
sisted of Western participants. There is evidence that cul-
tural background matters (see Mullen, 1994; Wang, 2014).
On average, participants from Eastern cultures report
later earliest memories than those from Western cultures.
A minority of our samples (i.e., 16% in Study 1 and 29%
in Study 2) indicated that their nationality as other than
German, Dutch or English. It is unknown how many had
an Eastern cultural background as we did not ask them
to specify. Nationality is unlikely to be responsible for the
present findings as it did not statistically differ between
the conditions in either study. However, our findings
cannot be generalised to other cultures. Future work may
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determine whether age estimates in early memories are
malleable in Eastern cultures as well.
Finally, the finding that asking about public-event
knowledge and self-relevant knowledge had a similar
effect on age estimates seems to be at odds with findings
that extensive cueing renders earlier memories (Jack &
Hayne, 2010). However, our self-relevant questions may
have been too generic to provide an advantage over a
natural tendency to self-generate cues based on autobio-
graphical knowledge. Cues are effective to the extent that
they overlap with aspects of the representation in
memory (Tulving & Thomson, 1973). It is thought that
this specificity is especially prominent in infancy, and
that with progressing development the power to reacti-
vate memories generalises to more abstract cues (such
as verbal reminders, Imuta, Scarf, & Hayne, 2013). Future
studies may use more extensive idiosyncratic questions
to see if activating self-knowledge yields earlier
(sketchy) memories than questions about public events
from an early life-time period.
Taken together, the results of the present studies show
that on average, age information introduced by the exper-
imental context affects subsequent estimates of the age in
earliest memories. Perhaps this information is used as a
starting point for initiating a memory search of a particular
life-time period. In addition, the age in snapshot memories
was younger than in event memories. The results of Study
1 suggest that snapshots might even be resistant to age
manipulations, yet this was not confirmed in Study
2. Future studies may further explore the phenomenologi-
cal properties of snapshot memories, including the esti-
mates of the age in those memories. Overall, the results
of the present studies add to the growing literature that
the age in earliest memories is malleable.
Notes
1. These items were “I do not recall this event very often” for the
subscale Accessibility and “As I think about the event, I actually
remember it rather than just knowing that it happened” for the
subscale Recollection.
2. There were 160 cases, but 1 participant started the question-
naire twice. Her incomplete record was discarded.
3. The Cronbach’s alphas pertain to the current sample.
4. For exploratory purposes, the questionnaire concluded with
the Beck’s Depression Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri,
1996) and a question about the overall affective tone of partici-
pants’ childhood (“All in all, I would describe my childhood as
…”) using a slider scale ranging from 0 (Negative) to 100 (Posi-
tive). There were no differences between conditions, and there
were no correlations between these measures and any of the
other variables in Study 2. In the interest of space, we refrain
from reporting these findings in detail. Information can be
obtained from the first author.
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